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Whispering Determinism: A Critique of Sartre’s Theory of Radical Freedom
Shiniece Owens, Fresno Pacific University

Some people believe serial killers should be held responsible for the death and
destruction they have caused in their lifetime. Most of us would like to say that if a serial
killer has committed a crime, he or she should be locked up and punished because he
or she chose—through the power of their own free will—to take the lives of innocent
people. However, the thought that serial killers are in fact responsible for their freely
chosen deadly actions, may in fact be wrong. There are good reasons to think that we
are not completely free. That is, despite our strong desire to believe in human freedom
and responsibility, powerful whispers or worries of determinism simply will not go away
(Sartre, 1940/2004, 157-158). Jean-Paul Sartre believed that humans are "radically”
free, which means they are 100% responsible for their actions and even their thoughts
(Sartre, 1957, 296). This includes our serial killer’s actions no less than it includes all
ordinary human actions. In this paper, however, I will argue that Sartre’s view of radical
freedom is false because we may be a lot more determined than we think. In order to
make my case against Sartre and human freedom, I will appeal to evidence from human
nature, the human thought process, and to an argument rooted in the laws of physics.
Before advancing my own argument, however, I will articulate Sartre’s view on freedom
in his famous and influential piece, Existentialism is a Humanism.
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Existentialism is a Humanism
Jean-Paul Sartre had strong opinions on free will and responsibility. He believed
that humans are radically free and thus radically responsible for their actions.
Undoubtedly, Sartre would at least endorse the Oxford English Dictionary definition of
free will, that it is "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the
ability to act at one’s own discretion” (Oxford, 2014, Web). To illustrate Sartre’s beliefs
on free will, I will reference advice he gave to a troubled student. The student told Sartre
that he had a very difficult choice to make; he had to choose either to go fight in the war
or to stay with his sickly widowed mother. The student was torn, because on the one
hand he was loyal to his country and wanted to serve, but on the other hand he loved
his mother and desperately wanted to take care of her. Sartre considered many moral
principles that might guide his lost student, such as Christianity’s principle to love one’s
neighbor, Kant’s categorical imperative, the utilitarian principle of promoting the greatest
happiness for the greatest number, and the moral subjectivist view that one should
follow one’s feelings. Sartre knew none of these would help his student decide what to
do. Take for example the Christian ethical principle "love your neighbor”. Who is really
the student’s neighbor, the mother, or the fellow countrymen fighting for freedom? The
answer is not clear. Now look at Kant’s categorical imperative which states, "Never treat
any person as a means, but as an end” (Sartre, 1957, 297). Sartre knew Kant’s moral
principal wouldn’t guide the student either and replied by saying,
Very well, if I stay with my mother, I’ll treat her an end and not as a
means; but by virtue of this very fact, I’m running the risk of treating the
people around me who are fighting, as means; and conversely, if I go join
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those who are fighting, I’ll be treating them as an end, and, by doing that, I
run the risk of treating my mother as a means. (Sartre, 1957, 297)
For Sartre, no moral principle or codes of ethics can give this student an answer for the
right thing to do. However, he still had a very simple answer for this troubled student; he
told him that he was free to choose his own actions (Sartre, 1957, 296-298).
Sartre believed that human beings have always been free and will always be
free. Illustrating his bold stance on freedom, Sartre claims that “...man is condemned to
be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is free;
because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does” (Sartre,
1957, 296). Sartre is basically saying that humans are completely free once they enter
the world. He is also saying that freedom comes with the burden of radical
responsibility. Indeed, this quotation suggests that responsibility follows from freedom,
or is at least deeply connected to it.
Moreover for Sartre, this is indeed radical responsibility, for he held that human
beings are responsible for what they do, think, interpret, and say. One example Sartre
uses to discuss his view of responsibility comes from a conversation he has with a
Jesuit he befriended while in prison. This friend had failed at almost everything he had
attempted up until that point. He finally failed in the military, so he took all of his failure
as a sign from God that he should become a Jesuit. According to Sartre, the Jesuit is “
... fully responsible for his interpretation” (Sartre, 1957, 299). In other words, the Jesuit
freely chose how he would interpret his life and his failures, as well as how he would
interpret the alleged message from God. Therefore, according to Sartre, he is fully
responsible for his interpretation (Sartre, 1957, 296-300).
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Human Nature
Unlike Sartre, I deny that humans have such radical freedom, and this raises
problems for human responsibility. That is, I believe humans are largely determined.
Determinism, according to a defensible definition in the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED), is the view that "all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by
causes external to the will” (Oxford, 2014, Web). The OED goes on to say, rightly, that
"Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have
no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions” (Oxford, 2014,
Web). As stated earlier, I believe humans are largely determined. The first piece of
evidence that supports my view is human nature. By human nature I mean the general
characteristics that all humans share, such as psychological features or capacities,
feelings, or behavioral traits. This definition of human nature means that in order to be
human, one must have certain human characteristics. If people need to have specific
traits to be considered human, then those specific traits are pre-determined (Helseth et
al., 2011,25-69). Some of these characteristics, which are essential to who we are, may
include features or capacities like the following: creativity, imagination, rationality, and
being genetically a member of the human species. Our characteristics are obviously
pre-determined because I did not choose to have the capacity for imagination, I did not
choose to have the capacity for creativity, and the same goes for the other
characteristics. Many of my general human qualities are determined. Therefore, it must
follow that if I have no choice in the matter regarding some of the qualities I possess,
then I am not completely (and radically) free.
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The Human Thought Process
Another reason why Sartre’s view of radical freedom is incorrect is illustrated by
the human thought process. A major part of human nature according to the philosopher
(and hard determinist) Baron d’Holbach is the reality of uncontrollable thoughts.
D’Holbach notes that "[Man] is born without his own contest; his organization does in
nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily” (Vaughn quotes
d’Holbach, 2012, 338). To illustrate d’Holbach’s view, consider what occurs when I utter
the phrase "stop reading and think of a pink elephant.” If I say "think of a pink elephant,”
it seems (nearly) impossible for my listener (or reader) not to mentally picture a pink
elephant. Indeed, you are likely picturing one right now. Similarly, suppose you try to
think of nothing for twenty seconds. It is impossible, or nearly so. The point here is that
all humans have had ideas that come unwillingly, and perhaps the majority of our ideas
are involuntary. If ideas come to us involuntarily, and ideas partly determine our actions
as well, then Sartre’s view of radical freedom is incorrect (Vaughn, 2012, 338-340).
Sigmund Freud himself defended this idea that the human mind receives
thoughts uncontrollably. Most people can relate to doing or thinking something they
wish they had not done or thought. This is part of the reason Sigmund Freud developed
his theory about the conscious and the unconscious (Hunt, 2007, 183-215). Freud said
that our unconscious drives the majority of our actions and thoughts. For example,
dreams include thoughts over which we have no control. We can all relate to not being
capable of controlling everything that we dream about. This is a parallel of our waking
thoughts; we are not capable of controlling all of them. If Freud is correct in saying the
majority of our thoughts (this includes dreams) and actions are controlled by something
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of which we are not in control, by definition most of our thoughts and actions are
determined (Hunt, 2007, 183-215). Now, if Freud, d’Holbach, or my argument thus far is
even partially correct, then Sartre’s view that we are radically free is indeed quite false.
The Law of Physics Argument
I will now offer one final argument that presses my case against Sartre even
further. Marczuk’s law of physics argument states that all concrete things are made up
of matter; this includes every part of the human body. Therefore the human brain (the
part of the body which controls human choices) is made up of matter. All matter which
makes up the universe operates according to the consistent and constant laws of
physics. Since human brains are made up of matter, and all matter operates according
to exceptionless laws of physics, then all human choices proceeding from the brain’s
activity are therefore determined by the physical laws that govern the brain (Marczuk,
2011, 1-15). Basically humans are controlled by laws of physics since we are made up
of matter. If this is true, then we probably do not have free will. Rather, we are more
than likely determined, or at least far less radically free than Sartre claims. Of course if
we are substantially (or completely) determined, then it would seem that we also fail to
be radically responsible for many or most of our actions.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, there are several good reasons to think that Sartre’s position
on radical human freedom and responsibility may be incorrect. Certain features of
human nature, the human thought process, and the laws of physics should make us
wonder if we are really this radically free. But if we are not free, this is really disturbing.
Among other things, it means the serial killer is not really responsible for the crimes he
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commits. For, if determinism is correct, or largely correct, how can we hold people
responsible for the morally horrific actions they commit? I conclude by suggesting that
perhaps Sartre’s view and my own view in this paper may be guilty of a basic mistake,
namely, the assumption that determinism eliminates freedom, and thereby also
eliminates responsibility. What if this assumption is false? That is, what if responsibility
requires determinism? After all, if I freely choose to do something, I determined to
perform that action. If I did not determine my action at all, then is it really mine? Even if
determinism is correct, perhaps being responsible for one’s actions requires and follows
from such determinism. If so, then perhaps we needn’t share Sartre’s worries about
whispers of determinism, even if such whispers turn out to be shouts (Sartre,
1940/2004, 157-158).

Published by Digital Showcase @ University of Lynchburg, 2014

7

Agora, Vol. 23 [2014], Art. 8

8

Works Cited
Helseth, P.K., Craig, W.L., Highfield, R., & Boyd, G.A. (2011). Four Views on Divine
Providence. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
Hunt, M. (2007). The Story of Psychology. (pp. 183-215). New York, NY: Anchor Books.
Marczuk, Z.J. (2011). Dennett’s account of the mind versus Kim’s supervenience
argument. International Journal for Philosophy, 16 (2), 1-15.
Oxford Dictionary. (2014). Oxford University Press. Retrieved from:
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/freewill?q=free+will
Sartre, J.P. (2004). The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the
imagination.(J. Webber, Trans.). London & New York, NY: Routledge. (Original
work published in 1940).
Sartre, J.P. (1957). The Humanism of Existentialism. In C.G. Guignon & D. Pereboom
(2.), Existentialism Basic Writings (pp. 290-308). (B, Frechtman, Trans.).
Indianapolis, IA: Hackett.
Stevenson, L. Haberman, D. L., & Wright, P. M. (2013). Twelve Theories of Human
Nature. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Vaughn, L. (2012). Great Philosophical Arguments, an Introduction to Philosophy. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.

https://digitalshowcase.lynchburg.edu/agora/vol23/iss2014/8

8

